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Abstract
We propose an empirically relevant measure of voting power that uses the information
about real or assumed voting patterns conveyed by a joint probability distribution on the
set of voting outcomes, and apply it to the voting data of the Supreme Court of the United
States.
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11 Introduction
A common criticism of the widely used Penrose (1946) or Banzhaf (1965) measure of voting
power is that it fails to take account of the preferences or actual behaviour of voters. Power is
assumed to arise purely from the voting rules and its measurement is conﬁned to an examination
of the possibilities that might exist for voting members to e ect decisions by switching their votes
given the likely voting behaviour by others. The criticism arises from the assumption that all
voting outcomes that can theoretically occur are considered to be equally likely. The probability
distribution of voting outcomes is not derived from evidence on actual behaviour, or assumptions
about voters’ preferences, but entirely a priori. The measure is therefore best described as a
measure of constitutional voting power, power that follows from the formal rules of the voting
body. Typically the rules are set at the constitutional stage of a voting body, prior to voting.
The assumption that all voting outcomes are equally probable is consistent with the binomial
model of voting in which each vote has an equal probability of being for or against a motion,
and all votes are independent. Felsenthal and Machover (2004) defend the binomial model on
two counts. Firstly, it is a rational assumption in the absence of prior knowledge about the
future issues on the ballot and how divided over these issues voters will be. It therefore suits the
purpose of measuring the distribution of a priori or constitutional voting power that follows from
the rules of the voting body in a purely formal sense. Second, the binomial model is attractive
on normative grounds because it presumes the maximum freedom of choice for the voter. It
therefore is the benchmark model to use in constitutional design.
In this paper we seek to construct an empirically relevant power measure by relaxing this
very strong assumption and replacing it by the use of information about real or assumed voting
patterns. Our starting point is to assume that voter preferences can be described in terms of
2a probability distribution over the various theoretically possible voting proﬁles. That is, we
know the probability of occurrence of every one of the large number of possible roll-calls. This
probability distribution can be estimated by observing actually occurring voting patterns over
a suitable period of time.1 We call the measure of empirically informed voting power that we
derive a behavioural power index.
We apply the behavioural power index to the Supreme Court of the United States. A large
amount of voting data reveal a large discrepancy between the Penrose-Banzhaf a priori measure
of power and the behavioural power estimated using the relative frequencies of voting outcomes.
The observed relative frequencies refute the assumption of equally probable voting outcomes
and therefore also the binomial model of equally probable and independent votes. We identify
positive correlation between votes as their primary cause.
In the next section we introduce a behavioural index of voting power. Section 3 describes
the data and presents computations of behavioural power for the justices in the U.S. Supreme
Court. Section 4 presents estimates of Coleman’s measure of the overall dependence and the
correlation coe cients between justices’ votes. Section 5 summarizes the paper.
2 A behavioural power index
We begin with a conventional description of the Penrose power index (also known as the abso-
lute Banzhaf index; see for example Felsenthal and Machover (1998)) to develop the analytical
framework and introduce the notation.
The voting body consists of n members, labelled i = 1,2,...,n, N = {1,2,... ,n}. Each
member has voting weight wi and must cast all her votes as a bloc either for or against a motion.
Notationally, letting vi represent the number of Yes votes cast by member i, we write vi = wi
1This obviously assumes sincere voting. We maintain this assumption throughout this paper.
3if she votes Yes and vi = 0 if she votes No. The decision rule is deﬁned by a majority quota
or threshold number of votes, q (.5
 n
i=1 wi) < q  
 n
i=1 wi) such that, if the total number of
votes cast by Yes voters is greater than or equal to q, the decision is Yes, and otherwise it is No.
We refer to any particular voting outcome, or the result of a ballot on some motion, as a
division, represented by a set D   N The total votes cast by Yes voters is w(D) =
 
i D wi.
It is common in the literature to refer to a division D as ‘winning’ if w(D)   q and ‘losing’
otherwise. We will here avoid this terminology and instead refer to a Yes decision and a No
decision respectively.
Now consider the power of member i. This is measured by swings. In general the power of
a member is her likelihood of being able to e ect a change in the decision by changing her vote,
that is to be a swing voter.
A swing for i is deﬁned in two ways:
i). An S-swing is a division S in which i votes No which would produce a No decision but
would become a Yes decision if i changed her vote to Yes. That is, S   N\{i}, such that
q   wi   w(S) < q;
ii). A T-swing is a division T in which i votes Yes which would produce a Yes decision unless
i changed her vote to No. That is, T   N, i   T, such that q   wi   w(T)   wi < q.
These two deﬁnitions are obviously dual because for every S-swing there is a T-swing where
T = S   {i}. It is useful to maintain the distinction however since it is used in the deﬁnition of
the behavioural power measure. More generally we will maintain the notation of S for a division
in which i votes No and T for one where i votes Yes. To simplify the notation we do not index
S and T or their probabilities with i but keep in mind that these are speciﬁc to each voter.
Let the number of swings, whether S-swings or T-swings, be  i. Then the Penrose power





This is the classical ‘a priori’ measure of voting power which assigns equal weight to each
division. In probabilistic terms, the measure (1) assumes that the conditional probability of
every set S given that i votes No (equivalently T given that i votes Yes) is equal to 21 n. That
is,
P[q   wi   w(S) < q|vi = 0] = 21 n, and P[q   wi   w(T)   wi < q|vi = wi] = 21 n.
The problem now is to generalise this idea to the situation where not all swings are equally
likely, but where the probability distribution is known, from empirical observation of voting
behaviour, or can be assumed to be known, on some other basis. We seek a measure of the
voting power of voter i in relation to decisions taken under the rules, recognising the behaviour
of the other n   1 voters both in relation to each other and also in relation to the behaviour of
i herself. However the actual behaviour of voter i, as reﬂected in the voting probabilities, is not
part of the measure of power.
In this we follow Braham and Holler (2005) and Morriss (2002) who argue that, because
power is fundamentally deﬁned as a dispositional concept, its possession or its magnitude does
not depend on its exercise. Power exists whether or not its possessor is observed to use it. This
means that the voting behaviour (or preferences) of voter i, as reﬂected in the probabilities of
her voting Yes or No cannot have any relevance to a power measure.
Morriss (2002) makes an important distinction between ‘power as ability’ and ‘power as
5ableness’. A voter’s ability is deﬁned as her power to e ect decisions whatever the actions of the
other voters. On the other hand, the term ableness refers to her power to e ect decisions in the
speciﬁc situation in which the voter ﬁnds herself given speciﬁc actions by others. The former
leads to a power measure which makes no assumptions about actual or likely voting behaviour,
treating all divisions that could possibly occur as equiprobable: the Penrose index. The latter
means taking account of the actual or expected voting behaviour of the other n 1 voters besides
i.
Morriss (2002) makes an important distinction between ‘power as ability’ and ‘power as
ableness’. A voter’s ability is deﬁned as her power to e ect decisions whatever the actions of
the other voters. On the other hand, the term ableness refers to the situation in which the voter
ﬁnds herself given speciﬁc actions by others. The former leads to a power measure which makes
no assumptions about the actual or likely voting behaviour of the voters other than i, treating
all divisions that could possibly occur as equiprobable: the Penrose index. The latter means
taking account of the actual or expected voting behaviour of the other n   1 voters besides i.
The behavioural power index deﬁned here is the probability of a swing for voter i. In order to
achieve the greatest empirical generality we do not assume neutrality of voting. This means that
the two deﬁnitions of a swing, S-swings and T-swings can no longer be treated as equivalent.
It is assumed that we know the probability distribution of voting outcomes, represented by
numbers,  D (0    D   1), for all divisions D   N.
The marginal probabilities for voter i are then (using the S and T distinction for divisions):
P[i votes Y es] = P[vi = wi] =
 
T:i T
 T =  i;
P[i votes No] = P[vi = 0] =
 
S:i/  S
 S = 1    i,
6The division probabilities  D represent the basic information about voting behaviour which
is relevant to the index. But i’s marginal voting probabilities  i and 1    i are not relevant.
They are used merely to ﬁnd the conditional probabilities of divisions given i’s vote. Since the
distribution of divisions is not independent of the vote of i, we deﬁne two conditional distributions
over divisions.
i). The conditional distribution of S-divisions: P[S|vi = 0] =  S =  S/(1    i) for all
S   N\{i}. Therefore if S is an S-swing,  S is the conditional probability of that particular
S-swing;
ii). The conditional distribution of T-divisions: P[T|vi = wi] =  T =  T/ i for all T   N,
i   T. Therefore if T is a T-swing,  T is the conditional probability of that particular
T-swing.
The behavioural power index is deﬁned as the probability of a swing for voter i:
 i = P[i votes No]P[S   swing|i votes No] + P[i votes Y es]P[T   swing|i votes Y es].
We set i’s voting probabilities to .5 and use the conditional probabilities deﬁned above in
this expression. The formula for the behavioural power index is:
 i = 0.5
 
S Swings




This measure reﬂects the power of i as a capacity to inﬂuence the outcome of a vote whether or
not that capacity is exercised. The fact that voter i has the a priori capacity to vote Yes or No
is allowed for by using equal probabilities for both events.
Table 1 gives an example of the above calculation for a weighted voting game with n = 3,
7q = 3, w1 = 3, w2 = 2 and w3 = 1. The discrepancy between behavioural and the a priori or
the constitutional power is evident. The assumed division probabilities are  D are such that all
voters have less behavioural than constitutional power. This need not be the case in general.
Table 2 gives an example of a weighted voting game with n = 5, q = 5, w1 = w2 = w3 = 2
and w4 = w5 = 1. Suppose that voters 2 and 3 never vote against one another, so that the
probability of all such divisions is zero, whereas all other divisions are equally likely. By voting
in unison, voters 2 and 3 e ectively comprise a voting bloc with the total voting weight of 4.
This increases their behavioural voting power at the expense of the other three voters, who vote
independently.
A special case is where i and the other voters are independent. Then, for any S and T
such that T = S   {i}, and  S =  T. This may be a rather restrictive assumption in practice,
however, and it seems unnecessary to impose it under our assumption that we have a complete
probability distribution of divisions.
Another special case is the Penrose index. Here we assume  S =  T = 21 n. Then
 i = 0.5
 
S Swings
21 n + 0.5
 
T Swings







=   
i. (3)
3 Voting power in the U.S. Supreme Court
The U.S. Supreme Court is the highest judicial authority of the United States. The court
comprises the Chief Justice and eight Associate Justices. The justices are nominated by the
President and appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate to serve for life.
The court votes under simple majority rule provided at least six justices are present for
the court to be in session. Justices vote in the order of their seniority, starting from the Chief
8Justice. Although the Chief Justice has a number of exclusive prerogatives and responsibilities,
all justices have equal a priori voting power.
It is customary to refer to the court by the name of the presiding Chief Justice, who usually is
the longest-serving member of the court. We deﬁne a bench as a court in which the same group
of persons sit as justices, and study three benches from the Chief Justice Warren (1953-1969),
Burger (1969-1986) and Rehnquist’s (1989-2005) eras.
3.1 The data
The Supreme Court Justice-Centered Judicial Databases sponsored by the University of Ken-
tucky and maintained by Benesh and Spaeth is a comprehensive source of data on the decisions
and opinions of individual justices during the three eras.
Several decisions had to be made when preparing the data. Our focus is on the relative
frequencies of divisions. For a meaningful analysis we therefore conﬁne to cases in which the
same bench of justices voted. Out of 228 observed benches we chose the three which had the
highest number of cases, one for each era. The high number of di erent benches arises from the
combinations of six to nine justices possibly attending a session, and from the fact that associate
justices retired and were replaced in the same era. Our selection includes 416, 1110, and 683
cases from respectively the Warren, Burger and Rehnquist eras, with the nine justices voting
on each case. Since we would like the cases to be as independent from each other as possible,
we exclude those with multiple legal issues or multiple legal provisions. Finally, we deﬁne a Yes
vote as one in favour of the petitioning party.2
2In terms of the variables in the Benesh and Speath databases, we restrict ANALU = 0, delete the duplicate
LED numbers and compute a vote variable which takes the value 1 if MAJ MIN = WIN DUM, and 0 otherwise.
93.2 Relative frequencies of divisions
Figure 1 shows the relative frequencies of divisions. With nine justices there will be 512 possible
divisions. The abscissa scale shows the divisions ordered from a unanimous vote against the
petitioning party to a unanimous vote in favour of the petitioning party. Note that:
i). only a small minority of possible divisions has actually occurred, the percentage in each
bench being Warren (9.4), Burger (31.6) and Rehnquist (21.5);
ii). relative frequencies of those which are observed are very unequal;
iii). unanimity is by far the most frequent of all outcomes. The Burger bench is an exception
with the 2:7 divisions against the petitioning party occurring slightly more frequently than
the 0:9 divisions;
iv). a unanimous vote in favour of the petitioning party is more frequent than a unanimous
vote against the petitioning party. This suggests a selection bias in the data in favour of
petitions with a reasonable chance of success. This point is noteworthy because the Chief
Justice ultimately decides which cases will the heard.
These observations refute the binomial model of equally probable and independent votes as an
empirical description. Although comprehensive voting records such as that for the U.S. Supreme
Court are scarce, data on several other voting bodies reveals that divisions typically occur with
very di erent frequencies. This is true of the Supreme Court of Canada (Heard and Swartz 1998),
the European Union Council of Ministers (Hayes-Renshaw, van Aken and Wallace 2006) and the
institutions of the United Nations (Newcombe, Ross and Newcombe 1970). In the next section
we show that positive correlations between votes are the primary cause of the observed pattern.
103.3 The behavioral power index
In a voting game with equal weights all voters have equal a priori powers. Under simple-majority
rule with an odd number of votes the Banzhaf absolute measure equals the binomial probability
of (n   1)/2 successes in n   1 trials with .5 as the probability of success. For n = 9 this
probability equals .273.
Table 3 reports the behavioural power index  i for each justice. It is evident that the justices’
behavioural powers are not equal. We quantify this inequality by comparing the Gini coe cient
of  i. The largest inequality is observed in the Warren bench, followed by Rehnquist and Burger.
The biggest losers in terms of behavioural vs. a priori voting power were justices Black, Douglas
and Clark of the Warren bench. None of the justices had more behavioural power than a priori
power.
4 Coleman’s measure of dependence
The fact that unanimity is by far the most frequent of all divisions points at positive correlation
between the justices’ votes. The correlation coe cient is a pairwise measure of linear dependence.
But is there a measure of the overall dependence between votes? One such measure has been
proposed in Coleman (1973).
Under the binomial model the variance of the fraction of Yes votes is  2 =  (1    )/n,
where   is the probability of a Yes vote, here common to all voters. The sample variance s2 will
systematically di er from  2 if the assumptions of the binomial model are not met. This will be
the case if votes are not independent, or if the true probability is not  , or both. For example,
if each pair of votes correlates with the correlation coe cients c, then s2    2[1 + (n   1)c],
provided (1   n) 1   c   1. Assuming the true probability is indeed  , the ratio  2/s2 is a
11rough measure of the overall dependence in a voting body of size n.
Coleman used this fact to compute the equivalent number of independent voters m. Setting
s2 =  (1  )/m yields m =  (1  )/s2. For independent voters s2    (1  )/n so that m   n.
Compared to n = 9, low values of m for the Warren (1.48), Burger (2.21) and Rehnquist (1.79)
benches point at high positive correlations between votes.
Coleman’s is a measure of the overall dependence. Table 4 reports estimates of the individual
marginal probabilities and correlation coe cients. They show that Yes votes are not far from
being equally probable but are highly positively correlated. For the three courts the average
probabilities of a Yes vote are .63, .47 and .54. The spreads of the estimated probabilities
range from (.44, .73) for the Warren bench to (.53, .55) for the Rehnquist bench. The average
correlation coe cients between two Yes votes for the three benches are .67, .39 and .5.
Fisher’s Exact Test3 cannot reject the null hypothesis of conditional independence at the ﬁve
percent level of signiﬁcance for only 7 of 108 pairs of justices indicated by an asterisk. There is
signiﬁcant positive correlation in justices’ decisions.
One consequence of high positive correlations is that voters often see their preferred outcome
prevail. Several authors have proposed to measure voting power using this probability (Stra n’s
(1978) Satisfaction index, Morriss’s (2002) EPW index). We believe that the probability of being
on the winning side is not a valid measure of power because it does not distinguish between
power and luck.4 For example, it assigns power to a voter who cannot swing in any theoretically
conceivable division of votes, a dummy. Our approach is to deﬁne power in terms of the capacity
to e ect a decision, based on the concept of a swing.
3See, Everitt (1992).
4This point has been extensively discussed by Dowding (1996).
125 Summary
The standard approach to measuring the voting power of a particular member of the voting
body is to compute the probability of her casting a decisive vote. This analysis must encompass
both the formal rules of the voting body and also the behaviour of all the voters. The member
is more powerful the more frequently her vote is decisive. But this will depend in practice on
circumstances created by others casting their votes so that she has opportunities to be decisive.
Thus an empirical voting power measure must be based on the frequencies with which the various
voting outcomes occur. As is well known, the Penrose-Banzhaf measure ignores behaviour and
takes into account only power deriving from the rules construed in a purely formal, a priori
sense.
We propose an empirically relevant power measure by relaxing this very strong assump-
tion and replacing it by the use of information about real or assumed voting patterns. The
behavioural power index is based on the joint probability distribution on the set of voting out-
comes, which can be assumed or estimated using ballot data.
The voting behaviour of justices in the U.S. Supreme Court clearly contradicts the assump-
tions of equally probable and independent votes. Over a range of cases, di erent voting outcomes
occur with very unequal relative frequencies. The observed patterns of relative frequencies point
to positive correlation as their main cause, and indeed we ﬁnd signiﬁcant positive correlation in
justices’ decisions.
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14Table 1: The behavioural power index for the game {4;3,2,1}
v1 v2 v3  D  S,1  S,2  S,3  T,1  T,2  T,3
3 2 1 0.309 0 0 0 0.618 0.515 0.386
3 2 0 0.016 0 0 0.078 0.031 0.026 0
3 0 1 0.131 0 0.328 0 0.262 0 0.164
3 0 0 0.044 0 0.111 0.222 0.089 0 0
0 2 1 0.249 0.499 0 0 0 0.416 0.312
0 2 0 0.026 0.052 0 0.13 0 0.043 0
0 0 1 0.111 0.221 0.276 0 0 0 0.138
0 0 0 0.114 0.228 0.285 0.57 0 0 0
Behavioural powers equal .71, .15 and .15. A priori absolute
Banzhaf powers equal .75, .25 and .25. S-swings and T-swings
are indicated with an underline. The joint probability distribution
 D satisﬁes the following probabilities and correlation coe cients:
 1 = .5,  2 = .6,  3 = .8 and c1,2 = .1, c1,3 = .2, c2,3 = .4.Table 2: The behavioural power index for the game {5;2,2,2,1,1}
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5  D  S,1  S,2  S,4  T,1  T,2  T,4
2 2 2 1 1 0.0625 0 0 0 0.125 0.125 0.125
2 2 2 1 0 0.0625 0 0 0 0.125 0.125 0.125
2 2 2 0 1 0.0625 0 0 0.125 0.125 0.125 0
2 2 2 0 0 0.0625 0 0 0.125 0.125 0.125 0
2 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 1 1 0.0625 0 0.125 0 0.125 0 0.125
2 0 0 1 0 0.0625 0 0.125 0 0.125 0 0.125
2 0 0 0 1 0.0625 0 0.125 0.125 0.125 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0.0625 0 0.125 0.125 0.125 0 0
0 2 2 1 1 0.0625 0.125 0 0 0 0.125 0.125
0 2 2 1 0 0.0625 0.125 0 0 0 0.125 0.125
0 2 2 0 1 0.0625 0.125 0 0.125 0 0.125 0
0 2 2 0 0 0.0625 0.125 0 0.125 0 0.125 0
0 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0.0625 0.125 0.125 0 0 0 0.125
0 0 0 1 0 0.0625 0.125 0.125 0 0 0 0.125
0 0 0 0 1 0.0625 0.125 0.125 0.125 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0.0625 0.125 0.125 0.125 0 0 0
Behavioural powers equal, respectively, .125, .5, .5, .125 and .125. A pri-
ori absolute Banzhaf powers equal .4375, .4375, .4375, .1875 and .1875.
Powers of voters 2-3 and 4-5 are equal by the equality of their weights
and behaviour. S-swings and T-swings are indicated with an underline.
The fact that voters 2 and 3 never vote against one another increases
their voting power at the expense of the other three voters.Figure 1: Relative frequencies of divisions










































































A division is represented by a binary vector (v1,v2,...,v9), where vi = 1 if i
votes in favour of the petitioning party, and vi = 0 otherwise. The abscissa
scale shows the divisions ordered in the ascending order of the decimals their
binary vectors represent, starting from the zero vector.Table 3: The behavioural power index
WARREN BURGER REHNQUIST
Black 0.009 Blackmun 0.106 Breyer 0.118
Brennan 0.046 Brennan 0.073 Ginsburg 0.072
Clark 0.017 Burger 0.089 Kennedy 0.074
Douglas 0.013 Marshall 0.106 Oconnor 0.112
Goldberg 0.047 Oconnor 0.096 Rehnquist 0.116
Harlan 0.063 Powell 0.059 Scalia 0.135
Stewart 0.019 Rehnquist 0.098 Souter 0.142
Warren 0.042 Stevens 0.060 Stevens 0.071
White 0.032 White 0.061 Thomas 0.070
Gini 0.306 Gini 0.126 Gini 0.150Table 4: Marginal probabilities and correlation coe cients
WARREN BURGER REHNQUIST
(i,j)  i  j ci,j (i,j)  i  j ci,j (i,j)  i  j ci,j
Black-Brennan 0.64 0.73 0.80 Blackmun-Brennan 0.44 0.51 0.36 Breyer-Ginsburg 0.55 0.53 0.72
Black-Clark 0.64 0.58 0.56 Blackmun-Burger 0.44 0.49 0.47 Breyer-Kennedy 0.55 0.55 0.48
Black-Douglas 0.64 0.65 0.74 Blackmun-Marshall 0.44 0.49 0.35 Breyer-O’Connor 0.55 0.55 0.54
Black-Goldberg 0.64 0.70 0.77 Blackmun-O’Connor 0.44 0.47 0.49 Breyer-Rehnquist 0.55 0.54 0.38
Black-Harlan 0.64 0.44 0.37 Blackmun-Powell 0.44 0.46 0.54 Breyer-Scalia 0.55 0.55 0.27
Black-Stewart 0.64 0.57 0.55 Blackmun-Rehnquist 0.44 0.50 0.37 Breyer-Souter 0.55 0.53 0.71
Black-Warren 0.64 0.72 0.79 Blackmun-Stevens 0.44 0.38 0.52 Breyer-Stevens 0.55 0.53 0.58
Black-White 0.64 0.64 0.69 Blackmun-White 0.44 0.54 0.46 Breyer-Thomas 0.55 0.55 0.24
Brennan-Clark 0.73 0.58 0.67 Brennan-Burger 0.51 0.49 0.00* Ginsburg-Kennedy 0.53 0.55 0.52
Brennan-Douglas 0.73 0.65 0.82 Brennan-Marshall 0.51 0.49 0.81 Ginsburg-O’Connor 0.53 0.55 0.50
Brennan-Goldberg 0.73 0.70 0.90 Brennan-O’Connor 0.51 0.47 0.05* Ginsburg-Rehnquist 0.53 0.54 0.41
Brennan-Harlan 0.73 0.44 0.51 Brennan-Powell 0.51 0.46 0.13 Ginsburg-Scalia 0.53 0.55 0.30
Brennan-Stewart 0.73 0.57 0.67 Brennan-Rehnquist 0.51 0.50 -0.10 Ginsburg-Souter 0.53 0.53 0.79
Brennan-Warren 0.73 0.72 0.95 Brennan-Stevens 0.51 0.38 0.36 Ginsburg-Stevens 0.53 0.53 0.62
Brennan-White 0.73 0.64 0.78 Brennan-White 0.51 0.54 0.12 Ginsburg-Thomas 0.53 0.55 0.27
Clark-Douglas 0.58 0.65 0.56 Burger-Marshall 0.49 0.49 -0.03* Kennedy-O’Connor 0.55 0.55 0.72
Clark-Goldberg 0.58 0.70 0.59 Burger-O’Connor 0.49 0.47 0.76 Kennedy-Rehnquist 0.55 0.54 0.75
Clark-Harlan 0.58 0.44 0.62 Burger-Powell 0.49 0.46 0.73 Kennedy-Scalia 0.55 0.55 0.65
Clark-Stewart 0.58 0.57 0.62 Burger-Rehnquist 0.49 0.50 0.75 Kennedy-Souter 0.55 0.53 0.57
Clark-Warren 0.58 0.72 0.66 Burger-Stevens 0.49 0.38 0.40 Kennedy-Stevens 0.55 0.53 0.3
Clark-White 0.58 0.64 0.69 Burger-White 0.49 0.54 0.59 Kennedy-Thomas 0.55 0.55 0.63
Douglas-Goldberg 0.65 0.70 0.77 Marshall-O’Connor 0.49 0.47 0.02* O’Connor-Rehnquist 0.55 0.54 0.71
Douglas-Harlan 0.65 0.44 0.34 Marshall-Powell 0.49 0.46 0.10 O’Connor-Scalia 0.55 0.55 0.63
Douglas-Stewart 0.65 0.57 0.52 Marshall-Rehnquist 0.49 0.50 -0.13 O’Connor-Souter 0.55 0.53 0.58
Douglas-Warren 0.65 0.72 0.83 Marshall-Stevens 0.49 0.38 0.33 O’Connor-Stevens 0.55 0.53 0.25
Douglas-White 0.65 0.64 0.63 Marshall-White 0.49 0.54 0.05* O’Connor-Thomas 0.55 0.55 0.64
Goldberg-Harlan 0.70 0.44 0.49 O’Connor-Powell 0.47 0.46 0.72 Rehnquist-Scalia 0.54 0.55 0.76
Goldberg-Stewart 0.70 0.57 0.66 O’Connor-Rehnquist 0.47 0.50 0.75 Rehnquist-Souter 0.54 0.53 0.45
Goldberg-Warren 0.70 0.72 0.89 O’Connor-Stevens 0.47 0.38 0.46 Rehnquist-Stevens 0.54 0.53 0.12
Goldberg-White 0.70 0.64 0.69 O’Connor-White 0.47 0.54 0.53 Rehnquist-Thomas 0.54 0.55 0.75
Harlan-Stewart 0.44 0.57 0.65 Powell-Rehnquist 0.46 0.50 0.67 Scalia-Souter 0.55 0.53 0.37
Harlan-Warren 0.44 0.72 0.48 Powell-Stevens 0.46 0.38 0.47 Scalia-Stevens 0.55 0.53 0.05
Harlan-White 0.44 0.64 0.63 Powell-White 0.46 0.54 0.58 Scalia-Thomas 0.55 0.55 0.87
Stewart-Warren 0.57 0.72 0.63 Rehnquist-Stevens 0.50 0.38 0.35 Souter-Stevens 0.53 0.53 0.58
Stewart-White 0.57 0.64 0.70 Rehnquist-White 0.50 0.54 0.50 Souter-Thomas 0.53 0.55 0.35
Warren-White 0.72 0.64 0.74 Stevens-White 0.38 0.54 0.34 Stevens-Thomas 0.53 0.55 0.03